Contact Graph Epidemic Modelling of COVID-19 for Transmission and
  Intervention Strategies by Leung, Abby et al.
Contact Graph Epidemic Modelling of COVID-19 for Transmission and
Intervention Strategies
Abby Leung, Xiaoye Ding, Shenyang Huang, Reihaneh Rabbany
School of Computer Science, McGill University
Mila, Quebec Artificial Intelligence Institute
{oi.k.leung, xiaoye.ding, shenyang.huang, reihaneh.rabbany}@mail.mcgill.ca
Abstract
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has
quickly become a global public health crisis unseen in re-
cent years. It is known that the structure of the human con-
tact network plays an important role in the spread of trans-
missible diseases. In this work, we study a structure aware
model of COVID-19 (CGEM). This model becomes simi-
lar to the classical compartment-based models in epidemiol-
ogy if we assume the contact network is a Erdo˝s-Ren´yi (ER)
graph, i.e. everyone comes into contact with everyone else
with the same probability. In contrast, CGEM is more expres-
sive and allows for plugging in the actual contact networks, or
more realistic proxies for it. Moreover, CGEM enables more
precise modelling of enforcing and releasing different non-
pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) strategies. Through a set
of extensive experiments, we demonstrate significant differ-
ences between the epidemic curves when assuming different
underlying structures. More specifically we demonstrate that
the compartment-based models are overestimating the spread
of the infection by a factor of 3, and under some realistic as-
sumptions on the compliance factor, underestimating the ef-
fectiveness of some of NPIs, mischaracterizing others (e.g.
predicting a later peak), and underestimating the scale of the
second peak after reopening.
Introduction
Epidemic modelling of COVID-19 has been used to in-
form public health officials across the globe and the sub-
sequent decisions have significantly affected every aspect
of our lives, from financial burdens of closing down busi-
nesses and the overall economical crisis, to long term affect
of delayed education, and adverse effects of confinement on
mental health. Given the huge and long-term impact of these
models on almost everyone in the world, it is crucial to de-
sign models that are as realistic as possible to correctly as-
sess the cost benefits of different intervention strategies. Yet,
current models used in practice have many known issues. In
particular, the commonly-used compartment based models
from classical epidemiology do not consider the structure
of the real world contact networks. It has been shown previ-
ously that contact network structure changes the course of an
infection spread significantly (Keeling 2005; Bansal, Gren-
fell, and Meyers 2007). In this paper, we demonstrate the
structural effect of different underlying contact networks in
COVID-19 modelling.
Figure 1: CGEM can utilize realistic contact networks.
Standard compartment models assume an underlying ER
contact network, whereas real networks have a non-random
structure as seen in Montreal Wifi example. In each network,
two infected patients with 5 and 29 edges are selected ran-
domly and the networks in comparison have the same num-
ber of nodes and edges. In Wifi network, infected patients
are highly likely to spread their infection in their local com-
munities while in ER graph they have a wide-spread reach.
Non-pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) played a signif-
icant role in limiting the spread of COVID-19. Understand-
ing effectiveness of NPIs is crucial for more informed pol-
icy making at public agencies (see the timeline of NPIs ap-
plied in Canada in Table 2). However, the commonly used
compartment based models are not expressive enough to di-
rectly study different NPIs. For example, Ogden et al. (2020)
described the predictive modelling efforts for COVID-19
within the Public Health Agency of Canada. To study the
impact of different NPIs, they used an agent-based model
in addition to a separate deterministic compartment model.
One significant disadvantage of the compartment model is
its inability to realistically model the closure of public places
such as schools and universities. This is due to the fact that
compartment models assume that each individual has the
same probability to be in contact with every other individ-
ual in the population which is rarely true in reality. Only by
incorporating real world contact networks into compartment
models, one can disconnect network hubs to realistically
simulate the effect of closure. Therefore, Ogden et al. (2020)
need to rely on a separate stochastic agent-based model to
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model the closure of public places. In contrast, our proposed
CGEM is able to directly model all NPIs used in practice
realistically.
In this work, we propose to incorporate structural infor-
mation of contact network between individuals and show
the effects of NPIs applied on different categories of contact
networks. In this way, we can 1) more realistically model
various NPIs, 2) avoid the imposed homogeneous mixing
assumption from compartment models and utilize different
networks for different population demographics. First, we
perform simulations on various synthetic and real world net-
works to compare the impact of the contact network struc-
ture on the spread of disease. Second, we demonstrate that
the degree of effectiveness of NPIs can vary drastically de-
pending on the underlying structure of the contact network.
We focus on the effects of 4 widely adopted NPIs: 1) quaran-
tining infected and exposed individuals, 2) social distancing,
3) closing down of non-essential work places and schools,
and 4) the use of face masks. Lastly, we simulate the effect
of re-opening strategies and show that the outcome will de-
pend again on the assumed underlying structure of the con-
tact networks.
To design a realistic model of the spread of the pandemic,
we also used a wifi hotspot network from Montreal to sim-
ulate real world contact networks. Given our data is from
Montreal, we focus on studying Montreal timeline but the
basic principles are valid generally and CGEM is designed
to be used with any realistic contact network. We believe
that CGEM can improve our understanding on the current
COVID-19 pandemic and be informative for public agencies
on future NPI decisions.
Summary of contributions:
• We show that structure of the contact networks signifi-
cantly changes the epidemic curves and the current com-
partment based models are subject to overestimating the
scale of the spread
• We demonstrate the degree of effectiveness of different
NPIs depends on the assumed underlying structure of the
contact networks
• We simulate the effect of re-opening strategies and show
that the outcome will depend again on the assumed under-
lying structure of the contact networks
Reproducibility: Code for the model and synthetic network
generation are in supplementary material. The real-world
data can be accessed through the original source.
Related Work
Network Structures and Disease Modelling
Different approaches have accounted for network struc-
tures in epidemiological modelling. Degree block approxi-
mation (Baraba´si et al. 2016) considers the degree distribu-
tion of the network by grouping nodes with the same degree
into the same block and assuming that they have the same
behavior. Percolation theory methods (Newman 2002) can
approximate the final size of the epidemic for networks with
specified degree distributions. Recently, Sambaturu et al.
(2020) studied the EPICONTROL problem which aims to
Date Location Event(s)
Mar. 11 [Worldwide] WHO declares global pandemic
Mar. 12 [QC] returning travellers to self-isolate
[ON] close public schools
Mar. 13 [ON, AB] cancel events > 250
[BC, MB] cancel events > 250
[NS, NB] discourage gatherings > 150
Mar. 14 [QC, ON] ban visits to long term care facilities
Mar. 15 [NS] close schools, childcare, casinos
ban visits to long term care facilities
ban gatherings over 150
Mar. 16 [Canada] close borders, excluding US.
[Canada] mandatory 14 days quarantine
[QC] close schools, universities, and daycares
Mar. 17 [ON, AB] ban public events of over 50
[BC] close schools, restaurants, and bars
Mar. 19 [NB] close most businesses, gatherings ≤ 10
Mar. 20 [Canada] close boarder with US
Mar. 23 [NS] quarantine for domestic travellers
[Canada] social distancing enforced
[ON, QC] close all non-essential workplace
Apr. 6 [Canada] advise to wear masks
May 22 [MTL] allow outdoor gatherings ≤ 50
ease social distancing for some
May 25 [MTL] reopen shops with exterior entrance
[QC] reopen manufacturers without restrictions
June 15 [MTL] reopen personal and aesthetic care
June 22 [MTL] reopen restaurants
June 28 [MTL] reopen educational childcare facilities
July 18 [QC] reopen offices
Aug. 1 [QC] allow indoor gathering ≤ 250
Aug. 5 [QC] allow outdoor gathering ≤ 250
Table 1: Timeline of Canada COVID-19 selected NPI events
based on (Vogel 2020; Lawson et al. 2020)
design effective vaccination strategies based on real and di-
verse contact networks. Various modifications are made to
the compartment differential equations to account for the
network effect (Aparicio and Pascual 2007; Keeling 2005;
Bansal, Grenfell, and Meyers 2007). Simulation-based ap-
proaches are often used when the underlying networks are
complex and mathematically intractable. Grefenstette et al.
(2013) employed an agent-based model to simulate the dy-
namics of the SEIR model with a census-based synthetic
population. The contact networks are implied by the behav-
ior patterns of the agents. Chen et al. (2020) adopted the In-
dependent Cascade (IC) model (Saito, Nakano, and Kimura
2008) to simulate the disease propagation and used Face-
book network as a proxy for the contact network. Social net-
works, however, are not always a good approximation for the
physical contact networks. In our study, we attempt to bet-
ter ground the simulations by inferring the contact networks
from wifi hub connection records.
Modelling Non-pharmaceutical Interventions
Table 2 shows the simulation of different NPIs in litera-
ture when compared to our model. Tuite, Fisman, and Greer
(2020) used an age-structured SEIR model to estimate the
spread of COVID-19 in Ontario, Canada. When studying the
effect of NPIs, their key outputs included final epidemic at-
tack rates (% of population infected at the end of the 2-year
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CGEM (ours) " " " "
Tuite, Fisman, and Greer (2020) " "
SEIR (Ogden et al. 2020) " "
Agent-based (Ogden et al. 2020) "
Chen et al. (2020) " "
Reich, Shalev, and Kalvari (2020) " "
Ferguson et al. (2020) " " "
Table 2: CGEM can realistically model all NPIs used in
practice while existing models miss one or more NPIs
period), prevalence of hospital admissions and ICU use, and
death. They assumed the effect of physical-distancing mea-
sures were to reduce the number of contacts per day across
the entire population. In addition, enhanced testing and con-
tact tracing were assumed to move individuals with non-
severe symptoms from the infectious to isolated compart-
ments. In this work, we also examine the effect of closure
of public places which is difficult to simulate in a realistic
manner for standard compartment models.
Ogden et al. (2020) described the predictive modelling
efforts for COVID-19 within the Public Health Agency of
Canada. They estimated that more than 70% of the Canadian
Population may be infected by COVID-19 if no interven-
tion is taken. They proposed an agent-based model and a de-
terministic compartment model. In the compartment model,
similar to Tuite, Fisman, and Greer (2020), effects of physi-
cal distancing are modelled by reducing daily per capita con-
tact rates. The agent model is used to separately simulate
the effects of closing schools, workplaces and other public
places. In this work, we compare the effects all NPIs used
in practice through a unified model and show how different
contact networks change the outcome of NPIs. In addition,
Ferguson et al. (2020) employed an individual-based simu-
lation model to evaluate the impact of NPIs, such as quar-
antine, social distancing and school closure. The number of
deaths and ICU bed demand are used as proxies to compare
the effectiveness of NPIs. In comparison, our model can di-
rectly utilize contact networks and we also model the impact
of wearing masks. Block et al. (2020) proposed three selec-
tive social distancing strategies based on the observations
that epidemic dynamics depends on the network structure.
The strategies aim to increase network clustering and elimi-
nate shortcuts and are shown to be more effective than naive
social distancing. Reich, Shalev, and Kalvari (2020) pro-
posed a selective social distancing strategy which lower the
mean degree of the network by limiting super-spreaders. The
authors also compared the impact of various NPIs, includ-
ing testing, contact tracing, quarantine and social distancing.
Neural network based approaches (Soures et al. 2020; Dan-
dekar and Barbastathis 2020) are also proposed to estimate
the effectiveness of quarantine and forecast the spread of the
disease.
Methodology
Contact Graph SEIR
In a classic SEIR model, referred to as base SEIR, the dy-
namics of the system at each time step can be described by
the following equations (Aron and Schwartz 1984):
dS
dt
= −βSI
N
dE
dt
=
βSI
N
− σE
dI
dt
= σE − γI
dR
dt
= γI
S
β
σ
γ
R
I
E
where an individual can be in one of the 4 states: (S) sus-
ceptible, (E) exposed, (I) infected and can infect nodes that
are susceptible, and (R) recovered at any given time step t.
β, σ, γ are the transition rates from S to E, E to I , and I to
R respectively.
Similarly, in CGEM, an individual can be either S sus-
ceptible, E exposed, I infected or R recovered. We do not
consider reinfection, but extensions are straightforward. Un-
like the equation-based SEIR model which assumes homo-
geneous mixing, CGEM takes into account the contact pat-
terns between the individuals by simulating the spread of a
disease over a contact network. Each individual becomes a
node in the network and the edges represent the connections
between people.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code for CGEM1. Given a
contact network, we assume that a node comes into contact
with all its neighbours at each time step. More specifically,
at each time step, the susceptible neighbours of infected
individuals will become infected with a transmission prob-
ability φ, and enter the exposed state (illustrated below).
We randomly select exposed nodes to become infected with
probability σ and let them recover with a probability γ.
φ
φ
φ
S
I
S
S
S
E E
R
I
SE
CGEM offers the flexibility of accommodating different
network structures and aligns better with the observation that
people tend to interact with each other selectively and lo-
cally in the real world.
1For brevity, we use the same notation for both set and size of
set, i.e. here S represents the number of susceptible in SEIR model,
whereas in CGEM S represents the set of susceptible individuals.
Input: Susceptible S, Exposed E, Infected I ,
Recovered R, transmission probability φ,
incubation rate σ, recovery rate γ
repeat
Contacts← [];
for i in I do
Contacts += neighbors(i);
end
∆E ← [];
for c in Contacts do
if c in S and random(0, 1) > φ then
∆E += c;
end
end
∆I ← randomly choose σ × |E| nodes from E;
∆R← randomly choose γ × |I| nodes from I;
I ← I + ∆I −∆R;
R← R+ ∆R;
until end of simulation;
Output: S,E, I,R
Algorithm 1: CGEM
Generalizing SEIR Model
CGEM provides a generalized version of SEIR model
which allows plugging in different structures. How can we
draw connections between the parameters between the orig-
inal model and our graph-based model? On the infection
propagation process, the only parameter that differs from the
original model is the transmission rate, φ. Other parameters
are directly matched with the original model. On the struc-
ture side, if substituting the ER graph with other synthetic
graphs, e.g. BA model (Baraba´si et al. 2016), the parame-
ters of the synthetic graph generation could be adjusted to
produce graphs with same sizes thus facilitating a fair com-
parison between different structures. We discuss details in
the following sections.
Inferring Transmission Rate By definition, β represents
the likelihood that a disease is transmitted from an infected
to a susceptible in a unit time. Baraba´si et al. (2016) assumes
that on average each node comes into contact with k neigh-
bors, then the relationship between β and the transmission
rate φ can be expressed as:
β = 〈k〉 · φ (1)
where 〈k〉 is the average degree of the nodes.
In the case of a regular random network, all nodes have
the same degree, i.e. 〈k〉 = k and equation 1 can be reduced
into:
β = k · φ (2)
The homogeneous mixing assumption made by the stan-
dard SEIR model can be well simulated by running CGEM
over a regular random network, we propose to bridge the two
models with the following procedure:
1. Fit the classic SEIR model to real data to estimate β.
2. Run CGEM over regular random networks with different
values of k and with φ derived from equation 2.
3. Choose k = k∗ which produce the best fit to the predic-
tions of the classic SEIR model.
The regular random network with average degree k∗
would be the contact network the classic SEIR model is ap-
proximating and φ∗ = β/k∗ would be the implied transmis-
sion rate. We will use this transmission rate for other contact
networks studied, so that the dynamics of the disease (trans-
missibility) is fixed and only the structure of contact graph
changes.
Tuning Synthetic Network generators As a proxy for
actual contact networks which are often not available, we
can pair CGEM with synthetic networks with more re-
alistic properties, comparable to real world networks e.g.
heavy-tail degree distribution, small average shortest path,
etc. To adjust the parameters of these generators, we can re-
frame the problem as: given transmission rate φ∗ and pop-
ulation size n, are there other networks which can produce
the same infection curve? For this, we can carry out sim-
ilar procedures as above. For example, we can run CGEM
with transmission rate φ∗ over scale-free networks generated
from different values of mBA, where mBA is the number
of edges a new node can form in the Barabasi Albert algo-
rithm (Baraba´si et al. 2016). mBA which produces the best
fit to the infection curve gives us a synthetic contact network
that is realistic in terms of number of edges compared to the
real contact network.
Modelling NPIs with Contact Graph SEIR
Here we explain how different NPIs can be modelled di-
rectly in CGEM as changes in the underlying structure.
Quarantine How can we model the quarantining and self-
isolation of exposed and infected individuals? Exposed indi-
viduals have come into close contact with an infected person
and are considered to have high risk of contracting. In an
ideal world, most, if not all, infected individuals would be
easily identifiable and quarantined. However, in reality, over
40% (He et al. 2020) of infected cases are asymptomatic and
not all are identified immediately or at all and therefore can
go on to infect others unintentionally. To account for this
in our model, we apply quarantining by removing all edges
from a subset of exposed and infected nodes.
Social Distancing Social distancing reduces opportunities
of close contacts between individuals by limiting contacts to
those from the same household and staying at least 6 feet
apart from others when out in public. In CGEM, a percent-
age of edges from each node are removed to simulate the
effects of social distancing to different extent.
Wearing Masks Masks are shown to be effective in reduc-
ing the transmission rate of COVID-19 with a relative risk
(RR) of 0.608 (Ollila et al. 2020). We simulate this by as-
signing a mask wearing state to each node and varying the
transmissibility, φ, based on whether 2 nodes in contact are
wearing masks or not. We define the new transmission rate
with this NPI, φmask as follows:
φmask =

m2 · φ, if both nodes wearing masks
m1 · φ, if 1 node wearing masks
m0 · φ, otherwise
Closure: Removing Hubs Places of mass gathering (e.g.
schools and workplaces) put large number of people in close
proximity. If infected individuals are present in these loca-
tions, they can have a large number of contacts and very
quickly infect many others. In a network, these nodes with a
high number of connections, or degree, are known as hubs.
By removing the top degree hubs, we simulate the effects
of cancelling mass gathering, and closing down schools and
non-essential workplaces. In CGEM, we remove all edges
from r% of top degree nodes to simulate the closure of
schools and non-essential workplaces. However, some hubs,
such as (workers in) grocery stores and some government
agencies, must remain open, so we assign each hub a suc-
cessful removal rate of psuccess to control this effect.
Compliance Given the NPIs are complied by majority but
not all the individuals, we randomly assign a fixed percent-
age of the nodes as non-compilers. We set this to 26% in all
the simulations based on a recent survey (Bricker 2020).
Reopening Strategies
Due to the economical and psychological impacts of a com-
plete lockdown on the society, it is critical to know how safe
it is to resume commercial and social activities once the pan-
demic has stabilized. Therefore, we also investigate the im-
pact of relaxing each NPIs and the risk of a second wave
infection. More specifically, we simulate a complete revers-
ing of the NPIs, by adding back the edges that were removed
when the NPI was applied at first, to return the underlying
structure to its original form.
Experiments
Dataset description
We compare the spread of COVID-19 with synthetic and
real world networks. These networks include 3 synthetic net-
works, (1) the Regular random network, where all nodes
have the same degree, (2) the Erdo˝s-Ren´yi random net-
work, where the degree distribution is Poisson distributed,
(3) the Barabasi Albert network, where the degree distri-
butions follows a power law. Additionally, we analyzed 4
real world network, the USC35 network from the Face-
book100 dataset (Traud, Mucha, and Porter 2012), consist-
ing of Facebook friendship relationship links between stu-
dents and staffs at the University of Southern California in
September 2005, and 3 snapshots of a real world wifi hotspot
network from Montreal (Lenczner and Hoen 2015), a net-
work often used as a proxy for human contact network while
studying disease transmission (Hoen et al. 2015; Yang et al.
2020). In the Montreal wifi network, edges are formed be-
tween nodes (mobile phones) that are connected to the same
public wifi hub at the same time. As shown in Table 3, each
of the 7 networks consist of 17,800 nodes, consistent with
1/100th of the population of the city of Montreal, and have
between 110,000 to 220,000 edges, with the exception of
the USC network. Due to the aggregated nature of the USC
dataset, edge sampling is enforced during the contact phase
in order to obtain reasonable disease spread. The synthetic
networks are in general more closely connected than the
Montreal wifi networks, despite having similar number of
nodes and edges. Only the largest connected component is
considered in all networks.
Network # nodes # edges Avg. shortest path
Regular 17,800 186,900 3.6
Erdo Renyi 17,800 220,000 3.4
Barabasi Albert 17,800 160,000 3.2
USC 17,444 801,853 2.8
Wifi 1 17,844 115,064 4.1
Wifi 2 17,841 111,760 4.2
Wifi 3 17,889 176,893 4.9
Table 3: Properties of the contact graphs studied
All Montreal and Quebec infection numbers are obtained
from Sante´ Montre´al (Montre´al 2020) and the Institut na-
tional de sante´ publique du Que´bec (INSPQ 2020) respec-
tivly.
Model Param Type Value Description
All
S i 17,796 # initial susceptible nodes
E i 3 # initial exposed nodes
I i 1 # initial infected nodes
R i 0 # initial recovered nodes
σ c 1/5 transition rate E → I
γ c 1/14 recovery rate
n c 17800 number of nodes
φ f 0.0371 transmission probability
β f 0.78 transition rate S → E
Regular k f 21 degree of each node
ER PER f 0.0014 probability of an edge
BA mBA f 10 # edges on new node
Table 4: Parameters for CGEM, Type i, c, f stands for ini-
tial, fitted, and constant parameters respectively. The values
for constant parameters are set based on (who 2020).
Structures Changes the Epidemic Curves
The structure of the contact network plays an important role
in the spread of a disease (Bansal, Grenfell, and Meyers
2007). It dictates how likely susceptible nodes will come
into contact with infected ones and therefore it is crucial to
evaluate how the disease will spread on each network with
the same initial parameters. Here, the classic SEIR model is
fitted against the infection rates from the first of the 100th
case in Montreal to April 4 to obtain β, which is before any
NPI is applied. With Eq. 2, the transmission rate, φ, is es-
timated to be 0.0371 and is used across all networks. In all
experiments, we also seed the population with the same ini-
tial number of 3 exposed nodes and 1 infected node. The
parameters used to generate synthetic networks are obtained
following the procedures described in the previous session.
All results are averaged across 10 runs. The grey shaded re-
gion shows the 95% confidence interval of each curve.
Figure 2: (left) projects spread of the pandemic on all
network structures without any NPI interventions. (right)
spread of the pandemic during the time period fitted to the
real data. The black dotted line indicates the date up to which
the infection rate of the synthetic networks is fitted against
the real world infection data, which coincides with the start
of closed down, first NPI, in real-world.
As shown in Figure 2, the ER network fits the base
SEIR model almost perfectly–compare green ’ER’ and black
’base’ curves.
Observation 1 CGEM closely approximates the base SEIR
model when the contact network is assumed to be Erdo˝s-
Ren´yi graph.
All networks drastically overestimates the spread of
COVID-19 when compared with real world data. This can
be expected to some degree as in this experiment we are pro-
jecting the curves assuming no NPI is in effect which is not
what happened in reality (see ’Real’ orange curve). How-
ever, we observe that all 3 synthetic networks, including the
ER model exceedingly overshoot, showing almost the entire
population getting infected, whereas the real-world wifi net-
works predict a 3x lower peak.
Observation 2 Assuming an Erdo˝s-Ren´yi graph as the con-
tact network overestimates the impact of COVID-19 by more
than a factor of 3 when compared with more realistic struc-
tures.
Structure Changes the Effects of NPIs
In order to limit the effects of the pandemic, the federal and
provincial governments introduced a number of measures to
reduce the spread of COVID-19. We simulate the effects of 4
different non-pharmaceutical interventions, or NPIs, at dif-
ferent strengths to determine their effectiveness. These in-
clude, (1) quarantining exposed and infected individuals, (2)
social distancing between nodes, (3) removing hubs, and (4)
the use of face masks.
Quarantine We apply quarantining into our model on
March 23. Where both Quebec and Canadian government
have asked those who returned from foreign travels or ex-
perienced flu-like symptoms to self isolate. We remove all
edges from 50, 75, and 95% of exposed and infected nodes
to simulate various strengths of quarantining. Figure 8 dis-
plays the effect of quarantining on different graph structures.
Quarantining infected and exposed nodes both reduces and
delays the peak of all infection curve. However, the peak
is not delayed as much in the wifi graphs as the ER graph
predicts, which is important information in planning for the
healthcare system. Out of all tested NPIs, applying quar-
antine has the most profound reduction on all infections
curves.
Observation 3 Quarantining delays the peak of infection
on the ER graph whereas the peak on the real world graphs
are lowered but not delayed significantly.
(a) ER (b) Wifi 2
Figure 3: Results of applying quarantine to 50, 75, and 95%
of nodes on ER and wifi2 graph structures. Other wifi net-
works show the same pattern and are omitted for brevity but
are reported in the supplementary materials.
Social Distancing reduces the number of close contacts.
Different degrees of 10%, 30%, and 50% of edges from each
node is removed to simulate this. Figure 9 shows the effects
of social distancing on the infection curves of each network
structures. It is effective in reducing the peak of the pan-
demic on all networks but again delays the peaks only on
synthetic networks. Similar to Observation 3, we have:
Observation 4 Social distancing delays the peak of infec-
tion on the ER graph whereas the peak on the real world
graphs are lowered but not delayed significantly.
(a) ER (b) Wifi 2
Figure 4: Results of applying social distancing by removing
10, 30, and 50% of edges to all nodes on ER and Wifi2 graph
structures. Same pattern is observed for wifi1 and wifi3 (ex-
tended results are reported in the supplementary materials).
Removing Hubs We remove all edges from 1% of top de-
gree nodes to simulate the closure of schools and 5 and 10%
of top degree nodes to simulate the closure of non-essential
workplaces. These NPIs are applied on March 23 respec-
tively, coinciding with the dates of school and non-essential
business closure in Quebec. psuccess is set to 0.8 unless oth-
erwise stated. Figure 10 shows the effects of removing hubs.
This NPI is very effective on the BA network and all 3 Mon-
treal wifi networks since these networks have a power law
degree distribution and hubs are present. However, it is not
very effective on the regular and ER random networks.
Observation 5 The ER graph significantly underestimates
the effect of removing hubs.
(a) ER (b) Wifi 2
Figure 5: Results of removing 1, 5, and 10% of hubs from
the ER and Wifi2 network. Again we see the same pattern
on the other two Wifi graphs.
Removing hubs is most effective on networks with a
power law degree distribution since hubs act as super spread-
ers and removing them effectively contains the virus. How-
ever, no hubs are present in the ER and regular random
network, and thus removing hubs reduces to removing ran-
dom nodes. Luckily, real world contact networks have power
law degree distributions, making a hubs removal an effective
strategy in practice.
Wearing Masks we setm2 = 0.6,m1 = 0.8 andm0 = 1,
and use the following transmission rate, φmask in CGEM:
φmask =

0.6 · φ, if both nodes wearing masks
0.8 · φ, if 1 node wearing masks
1 · φ, otherwise
Wearing masks is only able to flatten the infection curve
on the synthetic networks but does not reduce the final epi-
demic attack rate, the total size of population infected, as
shown in Figure 11. However, in the real world wifi net-
works, wearing masks is able to both flatten the curve and
also significantly reduce the final epidemic attack rate.
Observation 6 The ER graph significantly underestimates
the effect of wearing masks in terms of the total decrease in
the final attack rate.
Structure Changes the Reopening Strategies
We experiment with reopening of all the NPIs, but for
brevity we only report the results for allowing hubs, which
corresponds to the current reopening of schools and public
places. The results form other NPIs are available in the ex-
tended results.
For removing hubs, we apply reopening on July 18 (de-
noted by the second vertical line in Figure 7), after many
non-essential businesses and workplaces are allowed to open
in Quebec. Because the synthetic networks estimates that
most of the population would be infected before the hubs
are reopened, we calibrate the number of infected and re-
covered individuals at the point of reopening to align with
Figure 6: Difference between cumulative curves from wear-
ing masks and not wearing masks. The cumulative curves
represent the total impact, and the different shows how much
drop in final attack rate is estimated with the NPI enforced.
Figure 7: Reopening of 10% of hubs removed earlier. The
first vertical line represents when the NPI was enforced and
the second vertical line shows when it is lifted.
statistics available in the real world data. Therefore the sim-
ulation continues after reopening with all the models hav-
ing the same number of susceptible individuals, otherwise
int the ER graph, everyone is infected at that point. We can
see in Figure 7 that ER and regular random network signifi-
cantly underestimates the extent of second wave infections.
BA and the wifi networks all show second wave infections
with a higher peak than the initial, prompting more caution
when considering reopening businesses and schools.
Observation 7 ER graph significantly underestimates the
second peak after reopening public places, i.e. allowing
back hubs.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose to model COVID-19 on contact
networks (CGEM) and show that such modelling, when
compared to traditional compartment based models, gives
significantly different epidemic curves. Moreover, CGEM
subsumes the traditional models while providing more ex-
pressive power to model the NPIs. We hope that CGEM
could be used to achieve more informed policy making when
studying reopening strategies for COVID-19 .
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Appendix
Network generation
Montreal wifi network 3 snapshots of the Montreal wifi
network are used in this paper with the following time pe-
riods: 2004-08-27 to 2006-11-30, 2007-07-01 to 2008-02-
26, and 2009-12-02 to 2010-03-08. Each entry in the dataset
consists of a unique connection id, a user id, node id (wifi
hub), timestamp in, and timestamp out. Nodes in the net-
work are the users in each connection. An edge forms be-
tween users who have connected to the same wifi hub at
the same time. Connections are sampled with the aforemen-
tioned timestamp in dates to obtain ∼ 17800 nodes. Since
there are many disconnected nodes in the wifi networks, only
the giant connected component is used.
Synthetic networks We compared CGEM with the wifi
networks with 3 synthetic network models, the regular, ER,
and BA networks. In each of these models, we set the num-
ber of nodes to be 17,800 and fit respective parameters to
best match the infection curve of the base model and the
number of edges in the wifi networks. Table 5 shows the
Model Param Range best fitbegin end
Base SEIR β 0.50 1.00 0.78
Regular k 18 23 21
ER PER 0.00130 0.00150 0.00140
BA mBA 5 15 10
Table 5: Range of parameters fitted
range of numbers tested for each parameter and the fitted
values. All parameters are fitted to the officially reported in-
fected data and the mean squared error is minimized.
Computing Requirements
All the experiments have been performed on a stock laptop.
Assumptions
The following assumptions are made in CGEM:
1. Individuals who recover from COVID-19 cannot be in-
fected again
2. Symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals have the
same transmission rate and they quarantine with the same
probability
3. A certain percentage of the population do not compile
with NPIs regardless of their connection.
Structure Changes the Effects of NPIs
Quarantine Figure 8 shows the results of quarantining
on all graph structures. Quarantining infected and exposed
nodes both reduces and delays the peak of all infection
curve. However, the peak is not delayed as much in the wifi
graphs when compared to the regular and ER graphs.
Social distancing Figure 9 shows the results of applying
social distancing on all networks. Like quarantining, this is
effective in reducing the peaks of the infection curve on all
networks, but the delay of peaks is only apparent on the syn-
thetic networks.
Removing hubs Figure 10 shows the results of apply
school and business closure on all networks. The ER and
regular random networks significantly underestimates the
effect of removing hubs.
wearing masks Figure 11 shows the results of wearing
masks and without on each network.
All NPIs Figure 12 shows the infection curves of all the
networks with all NPIs applied. On March 23, 50% social
distancing and 50% quaranine is applied, and 10% of hubs
are removed with a success rate of 0.8. Wearing mask is ap-
plied on April 6. The wifi networks more closely resemble
the shape of the real infection curve.
(a) Regular (b) ER (c) BA
(d) Wifi 1 (e) Wifi 2 (f) Wifi 3
Figure 8: Results of quarantining 50, 75, and 95% of infected and exposed nodes on all graph structures.
(a) Regular (b) ER (c) BA
(d) Wifi 1 (e) Wifi 2 (f) Wifi 3
Figure 9: Results of applying social distancing by removing 10, 30, and 50% of edges to all nodes on all graph structures.
(a) Regular (b) ER (c) BA
(d) Wifi 1 (e) Wifi 2 (f) Wifi 3
Figure 10: Results of removing 1, 5, and 10% of hubs from each network.
(a) Regular (b) ER (c) BA
(d) Wifi 1 (e) Wifi 2 (f) Wifi 3
Figure 11: Results of with and without masks.
Figure 12: All NPIs applied according to the timeline in Ta-
ble 2
